Since 1980, the aggregate income of oil-exporting countries relative to that of oilpoor countries has been remarkably constant despite structural gaps in productivity growth rates. This stylized fact is analyzed in a two-country model where resourcepoor (Home) and resource-rich (Foreign) economies display productivity di¤erences but stable income shares due to terms-of-trade dynamics. We show that Home's income share is positively related to the national tax on domestic resource use, a prediction con…rmed by dynamic panel estimations for sixteen oil-poor economies. National governments have incentives to deviate from both e¢ cient and laissez-faire allocations. In Home, increasing the oil tax improves welfare through a rent-transfer mechanism. In Foreign, subsidies (taxes) on domestic oil use improve welfare if R&D productivity is lower (higher) than in Home.
Introduction
The functioning of modern economies crucially relies on the primary inputs obtained from exhaustible natural resources and, due to the uneven distribution of endowments of fossil fuels and minerals, many industrialized economies heavily depend on imports from resource-rich countries. The relevance of this form of trade dependence is emphasized by the statistics -fossil fuels and minerals now account for 22.5% of world merchandise trade (World Trade Organization, 2009: p.43 ) -and is increasingly regarded as a crucial determinant of the growth performance of resource-rich economies (Lederman and Maloney, 2007) . Few studies, however, analyze in detail the implications of asymmetric trade between resource-rich and resource-poor countries from the perspective of modern growth theory. In this paper, we exploit the endogenous growth framework to analyze the determinants of national income shares and the e¤ects of resource taxation on welfare distribution.
Our empirical reference is the economic performance of the world's top net exporters of oil -henceforth labelled as OEX group -relative to that of big oil-poor economies, i.e., the world's top importers whose domestic oil production is zero or negligiblehenceforth labelled as OIM group. Since 1980, the ratio between the aggregate incomes of the two groups has been constant: the OIM share over the total income of the two groups is 73%, and its time pro…le over the last three decades is remarkably ‡at (cf. section 2). This result is surprising in view of the productivity di¤erentials observed during the same period: labor productivity has stagnated or declined in most OEX countries while it has substantially increased in OIM economies.
In line with these empirical facts, we build a two-country model in which productivity growth rates di¤er across countries but the world income distribution is stable over time. A resource-poor economy (henceforth called Home) imports a …nal good and an exhaustible primary input from a resource-rich economy (henceforth called Foreign) and only exports its …nal consumption good. Both countries exhibit endogenous growth driven by R&D: in equilibrium, productivity growth di¤erentials are compensated by the dynamics of the prices of traded goods, and income shares are constant.
Our …rst aim is to study the determinants of national income shares and check whether the theoretical predictions are supported by empirical evidence. The model predicts that the income share of OIM economies is (i) positively related to the domestic rate of R&D investment, (ii) negatively related to the outher country's investment rate, (iii) positively in ‡uenced by the domestic tax on resource use due to a peculiar rentextraction mechanism. Our panel estimations for sixteen OIM economies in relation to an aggregate group of ten OEX economies con…rm the positive (negative) e¤ect of domestic (foreign) saving rates as well as the positive impact of domestic oil taxes on income shares.
Our second aim is to link the model predictions to the policy debate. The recent up-surge in oil prices revived the interest for the analysis of strategic tax policies between resource-rich and resource-poor economies. The crucial question is: do economies involved in asymmetric trade have peculiar incentives to implement ine¢ cient taxes on domestic resource use? We show that these incentives exist and are particularly strong for oil importers. First, if the initial state of a¤airs is an e¢ cient equilibrium in which all domestic market failures are internalized, the Home government can increase domestic welfare by raising the national resource tax above the e¢ cient level: due to the rent-extraction mechanism, a higher resource tax increases Home's relative income and enhances consumption possibilities. Second, if the initial state of a¤airs is a laissez-faire equilibrium, productivity di¤erences come into play: in the empirically plausible case where productivity growth is higher in the resource-poor economy, Home's incentive to raise the resource tax is reinforced whereas Foreign has an incentive to subsidize domestic resource use. Both these results appear consistent with the behavior that is typically observed in reality (Gupta et al. 2002; Metschies, 2005) .
As mentioned above, few studies analyze the implications of asymmetric trade between resource-rich and resource-poor countries from the perspective of modern growth theory. The trade-and-growth literature typically neglects asymmetric trade structures induced by uneven endowments of primary inputs. In the early resource economics literature, two-country models assumed that the accumulation of man-made capital inputs was either absent (Kemp and Suzuki, 1975; Brander and Djajic, 1983) or subject to diminishing returns (Chiarella, 1980; Van Geldrop and Withagen, 1993) . The parallel literature on endogenous growth with natural resources as inputs, pioneered by Barbier (1999) and Scholz and Ziemes (1999) , generally refers to closed or small open economies: to our knowledge, the two-country setting is only considered in two recent papers by Daubanes and Grimaud (2006) and Peretto and Valente (2010) that di¤er from the present analysis in both aims and means. 1
Empirical Facts
Our theoretical analysis focuses on tradeable exhaustible resources and can be applied to several types of minerals and fossil fuels. The main empirical reference, however, is the relative economic performance of oil-rich and oil-poor economies. The …rst column of Table 1 lists a group of countries, labeled as OEX, which comprises the seventeen top oil exporters at the world level over the period 1980-2008. 2 These economies satisfy two requirements: during the relevant period, each country (i) has never been a net oil importer and (ii) steadily appeared in the top exporters list in each single year. In 1 Daubanes and Grimaud (2006) use a North-South model where oil generates pollution and economic growth is exclusively driven by the technology of the oil-poor economy: there are no productivity gaps and terms of trade are excluded by the homogeneity of the …nal consumption good. Peretto and Valente (2009) assume identical R&D technologies between countries in a non-scale model of endogenous growth featuring both vertical and horizontal innovations. They analyze the e¤ects of resource booms, i.e. unexpected discoveries of new resource stocks on innovation rates and relative welfare. 2 We consider seventeen countries and draw the line below Kazakhstan because the subsequent positions are occupied by countries exporting much less oil in absolute terms. Over the 1980-1992 period, the Russian Federation would be replaced by USSR, and the 17th top exporter would be Egypt, whose average yearly net exports have been nearly one half of the preceding country, Canada. Over the 1992-2008 period, the 18th top exporter is Colombia, with similar …gures in proportion to Kazakhstan. Indonesia and United Kingdom are excluded from the computations since they both turned from net exporters in the 1980s to net importers nowadays. Table 1 , the ratio between oil consumption and production in physical terms highlights di¤erent degrees of dependence and/or specialization. Due to data availability, real output growth rates for OEX countries are calculated for two subsets: OEX-15, which excludes Iraq and Lybia, and OEX-13, which also excludes Russia and Kazakhstan.
OEX Countries
Oil Net Exports* Oil Cons./Prod.** Real GDP Growth*** 1980-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008 1980-2006 1990-2006 We compare the OEX group with seventeen economies that, during the same period, (i) steadily appeared in the list of top oil-importers and (ii) relied on imported oil for domestic use. Speci…cally, we have excluded all countries producing more than 10% of the oil they consume domestically. 3 The resulting list of oil-poor, oil-importing countries is labelled as OIM and is reported in Table 2 : the third column shows the ratio between net imports and domestic oil consumption, which does not fall short of 90% (the limit case is Netherlands). Data on real GDP growth for the whole set of countries, labeled as OIM-17, cover the 1990-2006 period. The subset OIM-15, which excludes Germany and Poland, covers the 1980-2006 period.
OIM Countries
Oil Net Imports* Oil Net Imp./Cons.** Real GDP Growth*** 1980-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008 1980-2006 1990-2006 The …rst empirical fact concerns the behavior of gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national income (GNI) calculated in purchasing power parity. Computing the income shares of each group over the total income of both groups in each year, all the resulting time paths are remarkably ‡at. This result is robust to alternative PPP-adjusted measures of GNI and GDP, both in constant and in current prices. An example is reported in Figure 1 : the GDP share of OEX-13 versus OIM-15 countries in 2006 is 73%, almost identical to the value observed in 1980, and there is little variation during the whole period. The same result is obtained for GDP shares of OEX-15 versus OIM-17 countries between 1990 and 2006.
The second empirical fact is related to productivity growth. Using the series of labor productivity levels calculated by the International Labor Organization (2009), 4 we normalize the 1980 level to unity for each country and obtain the time paths depicted in Figure 2 . There are substantial productivity growth di¤erentials in favor of OIM economies: apart from Canada and Norway, OEX countries have been falling behind oil-importing economies over the last three decades. 
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The existence of substantial gaps in productivity growth rates in conjunction with balanced GDP growth at the international level suggests that stationary income shares may originate, at least in part, in the compensating e¤ect of the prices of traded goods. In the next section, we present a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which income shares are constant because structural gaps in productivity growth are compensated by the dynamics of terms of trade.
The Model
The world comprises two countries, Home and Foreign, indexed by i = h; f . Each economy produces a tradable …nal good, consumed by the residents of both countries, using man-made intermediate inputs and an exhaustible natural resource. As the resource stock is entirely owned by Foreign residents, the structure of trade is asymmetric: Home only exports its …nal good whereas Foreign exports its …nal good and natural resource units. The engine of growth is represented by R&D activity that expands the number of varieties of intermediate inputs -e.g., as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) . Intermediates'producers earn monopoly rents, and the productivity of R&D …rms is enhanced by knowledge spillovers that eliminate scale e¤ects. National governments have access to three …scal instruments -a subsidy to R&D investment, a tax on …nal producers, and a tax on domestic resource use -that can be used to correct for domestic market failures. Our primary interest, however, is the role of national resource taxes as potential strategic instruments: we will analyze in detail the welfare e¤ects of resource taxes when governments deviate from both laissez-faire and e¢ cient allocations.
Using conventional notation, the time-derivative and the growth rate of variable g (t) are respectively denoted by _ g (t) dg (t) =g (t) andĝ (t) _ g (t) =g (t). All Propositions are proved in Appendix.
Final Producers, Intermediate Sectors and R&D
Final Sector. In each economy, the …nal sector produces Y i units of a country-speci…c …nal good by means of M i varieties of di¤erentiated man-made intermediate products, L i units of labor, and R i units of an exhaustible resource, according to the production function
where X i (m i ) is the quantity of the m i -th variety of intermediate input employed in production, and v i denotes the productive e¢ ciency of each worker. Parameters satisfy + + = 1, with 0 < ; ; < 1. As the engine of growth is represented by increases in the number of intermediate products, we assume that workers'e¢ ciency v i grows at the exogenous constant ratev i = i , and that labor is supplied inelastically: L h and L f are …xed amounts and coincide with population size in Home and Foreign, respectively. The law of one price holds for all traded goods: the quantities (Y h ; Y f ) are sold at the respective world prices (P h Y ; P f Y ) and the exhaustible resource is sold to all …nal producers at the same world price P R . Labor and intermediates are not traded so that the wage rate and the price of each intermediate, respectively denoted P i L and P i X(m i ) , are country-speci…c. Production costs are a¤ected by …scal policy: we denote by b i the tax on the purchases of intermediates, and by i the tax on domestic resource use. 5 The pro…t-maximizing conditions on resource use and intermediates respectively imply
where (3) 
and therefore symmetric quantities and pro…ts across monopolists (see Appendix).
R&D Sector. The number of intermediates'varieties M i grows over time by virtue of R&D activity pursued by competitive …rms that develop new blueprints and sell the relevant patent to an incumbent intermediate producer. R&D …rms can be represented as a consolidated sector earning zero pro…ts due to free-entry. 6 Developing blueprints requires investing units of the domestic …nal good: each unit has a constant marginal productivity i > 0, taken as given by R&D …rms, and for each unit invested, R&D …rms receive from the national government a subsidy at constant rate a i > 0. Denoting by Z i the total amount invested by R&D …rms, total investment in country i is Z i (1 + a i ), and the increase in the number of varieties equals
The productivity of the R&D sector is a¤ected by externalities whereby the current marginal productivity of investment, i , is positively in ‡uenced by past research e¤ort. These externalities take the form of knowledge spillovers, exactly as in models à la Lucas (1988) where the di¤usion of public knowledge implies an un-compensated transmission of human capital across generations. In the present context, the productivity of each R&D …rm is higher the better the 'current state of technology attained by virtue of previous research'. This concept of state-of-the-art in research is conveniently measured by the ratio between the number of existing varieties and current output levels, M i =Y i . We thus posit a linear function
where ' i > 0 is a constant proportionality factor determining the social productivity of R&D. From from (5) and (6), the growth rate of intermediates' varieties increases linearly with the economy-wide rate of R&D investment:
As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.300-302) point out, the linear law (7) generally exhibits two desirable properties: it eliminates scale e¤ects by making the equilibrium growth rate of output independent of the size of endowments, and is empirically plausible since, in most industrialized economies, productivity growth appears to be positively related to the rate of R&D investment.
Resource Extraction in Foreign
In each instant, total resource extraction R (t) equals the sum of the resource units employed in the two countries, R (t) R h (t) + R f (t). The resource stock Q (t) is nonrenewable and is given at t = 0. Extracting …rms are competitive and take the world price of the resource P R as given. For simplicity, extraction costs are zero. The owners of extracting …rms are households in Foreign, each of whom earns the same fraction 1=L f of rents. Normalizing the mass of …rms to unity 7 , the representative …rm maximizes the present-value stream of pro…ts
subject to the dynamic resource constraint _ Q (t) = R (t). The solution to this dynamic problem is characterized by the conditionŝ
Equation (9) is the standard Hotelling rule: the resource price must grow over time at a rate equal to the rate of return to investment in the economy. Equation (10) is the intertemporal resource constraint requiring asymptotic exhaustion of the resource stock.
which is the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule.
Trade. Ruling out asset mobility, trade is balanced in each instant: the value of Foreign total exports -resources plus exported consumption goods -equals the value of …nal goods imported from Home,
The resource-rich economy exhibits a structural de…cit in …nal-goods trade: this asymmetric structure of international trade will be crucial for the results.
Aggregate Constraints. To simplify the notation, denote aggregate R&D expenditures of country i as
The total expenditure index of country i is de…ned as
, and the aggregate income constraints of the two economies read
From (16), total incomes in Home equal the value of …nal output less the value of resource rents paid to Foreign resource owners. In (17), resource rents are added to the value of …nal production in Foreign to obtain total Foreign incomes.
Competitive World Equilibrium
In each country, the equilibrium rates of return read (see Appendix)
where i denotes the last term in square brackets and is a measure of physical productivity growth in the …nal sector of country i. Productivity growth incorporates the e¤ect of three country-speci…c characteristics: the social productivity of R&D (crucially determined by ' i ) , the growth rate of labor e¢ ciency ( i ), and the growth rate of domestic resource use (R i ). From (18), we can decompose the interest rate di¤erential between Home and Foreign into a price component and a productivity term:
The price component is a standard terms-of-trade e¤ect, determined by di¤erences in the growth rates of …nal goods' prices. The term ( h f ) re ‡ects gaps in physical productivity growth -henceforth, structural gaps. The following Proposition establishes that terms-of-trade e¤ects exactly compensate for structural gaps in each point in time, implying the equalization of equilibrium interest rates:
Proposition 1 In the world competitive equilibrium, interest rates are equalized, r h (t) = r f (t) in each t 2 [0; 1), and terms of trade compensate for structural gaps:
Equal interest rates imply that consumption grows at the same rate in the two countries. We now show that this, in turn, implies balanced growth at the world level in each instant and therefore constant income shares. The key variable determining the equilibrium distribution is the ratio between resource-use ‡ows, which we denote as (t) R h (t) =R f (t), and henceforth call relative resource use. Given this de…nition, the world competitive equilibrium is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 The world competitive equilibrium exhibits a constant relative resource use (t) R h (t) =R f (t) = in each t 2 [0; 1). Output, resource use, expenditures and the mass of varieties grow at rateŝ
The …nal output ratio
Result (21) shows that di¤erences between the growth rates of physical …nal output in the two countries are due to structural gaps between the respective productivity indices ( h 6 = f ), which re ‡ect possible di¤erences in R&D productivity (' h 6 = ' f ), in taxes on intermediates'purchases (b h 6 = b f ), or in labor e¢ ciency growth ( h 6 = f ). Income shares are constant by virtue of the terms-of-trade mechanism already emphasized in Proposition 1: price dynamics compensate for structural gaps, yielding balanced growth at the world level. Conceptually, this mechanism is similar to that emphasized by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) in a di¤erent model where countries produce a homogeneous good but exhibit heterogeneous technologies. 8 In the world equilibrium, the determinants of relative resource use and market shares in …nal output are crucially determined by the willingness to invest of the two economies. One possible de…nition of willingness to invest is (see Appendix)
where the right hand side equals the fraction of …nal output invested in R&D activity (…rst term) plus the fraction of output spent in producing intermediates (second term) in country i. Given (25), the equilibrium level of relative resource use equals (see Appendix)
Equation (26) shows that, in each country, relative resource use increases with the domestic investment rate and declines with the domestic resource tax. However, resource taxes do not a¤ect the respective market shares in …nal goods: the output ratio equals (see Appendix)
which does not depend on h nor on f . The reason for this result is that if a country raises the domestic resource tax, resource use and physical output fall but the relative price of the produced …nal good increases. The net e¤ect on market shares is zero because terms of trade exactly compensate for physical quantities:
Proposition 3 An increase in the Home (Foreign) resource tax reduces Home (Foreign) resource use and physical output, increases the relative price of the Home (Foreign) good,
but leaves …nal output shares unchanged:
Proposition 3 establishes the neutrality of resource taxes with respect to …nal output shares. However, resource taxation is not neutral with respect to relative income and welfare levels. Indeed, the fundamental di¤erence between our framework and standard two-country models -e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991) -is the asymmetric structure of trade. This implies that income shares are a¤ected by the degree of dependence of the Home economy on the exhaustible resources supplied by Foreign, and that Home and Foreign taxes on resource use have asymmetric e¤ects on relative income and welfare levels. The following sections address each point in turn.
Income Shares: Theory and Evidence
The asymmetric structure of international trade implies that income shares di¤er the market shares in world …nal output and depend on the degree of Home dependence on imported resources. Speci…cally, the income share of the Home economy equals (see Appendix)
where~ h (1 + h ) 1 is the tax-adjusted resource elasticity in …nal production in
Home. The income share of Foreign residents is obviously symmetric and equals s f 1 s h . Expression (28) shows that Home's income share is the product of two factors. The …rst is Home's …nal output share. The second represents the e¤ect of dependence on resource imports: Home producers must use a fraction~ h of revenues from …nal-good sales to …nance resource imports. 9 Hence, the income share equals the …nal output share net of the rents paid to Foreign resource owners. Starting from (28), we show that Home resource taxes increase Home's relative income, and that the model predictions regarding the determinants of income shares …nd empirical support in OIM countries.
Income Shares and Resource Taxes
A peculiar feature of our model is that Home and Foreign resource taxes have asymmetric e¤ects on relative income levels:
Proposition 4 An increase in the Home resource tax increases Home's income share relative to Foreign. An increase in the Foreign resource tax leaves income shares unchanged:
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. If Home increases the domestic resource tax, h , domestic …nal output declines in physical terms but its relative price increases and the net e¤ect on …nal output shares is zero (cf. Proposition 3). However, the increase in the resource tax also implies that a lower fraction of domestic output is spent on resource rents. Hence, an increase in h increases Home's relative income through the reduction of~ h -i.e., the term respresenting Home's dependence on resource imports in (28). Due to the asymmetric structure of trade, changes in the Foreign resorce tax have di¤erent consequences. On the one hand, an increase in f leaves …nal output shares unchanged (cf. Proposition 3). On the other hand, f does not in ‡uence Home's resource dependence,~ h , so that variations in the Foreign resource tax do not a¤ect the income shares of the two countries. For future reference, we will label the positive income e¤ect of the Home resource tax as a rent-extraction e¤ect: higher resource taxes in Home restrict domestic resource use and thereby the value of the rents paid to Foreign owners.
Determinants of Income Shares: An Empirical Test
Our results on the determinants of income shares can be summarized as follows. Substituting (27) in (28), we can rewrite Home's income share as a function of the domestic resource tax and of investment rates:
That is, the income share of the resource-poor economy is (i) positively related to the domestic investment rate, (ii) negatively related to the investment rate of the resourcerich economy, and (iii) positively related to the national tax on domestic resource use. We now test this prediction empirically, using a dynamic panel-estimation technique. The time period is 1980-2008, and the countries for which we have data are sixteen OIM countries -namely Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey -and the ten OEX countries -i.e., Algeria, Canada, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Norway, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. This is the country sample which best represents the framework of our theoretical model and for which the relevant data are nearly completely available, except for taxes in the Philippines and Singapore.
In order to focus on long-run e¤ects and to avoid the impact of business cycles, we build …ve-year averages; the considered periods are: 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04, and 2005-08. To capture the dynamic development we include lags of the dependent variable. By construction, the emerging unobserved panel-level e¤ects are then correlated with the lagged dependent variables, making standard estimators inconsistent. That is why the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation is used; it provides a consistent generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator for the parameters of this model.
We use online data from the World Bank (2009) for the macroeconomic variables and from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2009) for resource taxes. Incomes shares are calculated for each oil-importing country as the ratio between its GNI level and the sum of the GNIs of all oil-exporting countries, which we label by shareoim. For the investment rates, we take gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP for both oil-importing and -exporting countries. In the case of oil importers, the variable is denoted by investoim; for oil exporters we calculate the average investment rate -with population size used as the weighting factor -to get the parameter investoex. Resource taxes are measured by taxes on light fuel oil and labelled with oiltax. Further control variables are education expenditures as a percentage of GDP (eduexp, the investment rate for human capital), research expenditures as a percentage of GDP (rdexp, the investment rate for knowledge capital), population size pop, and central government debt as a percentage of GDP cgovdebt.
The results are presented in Table 3 , which includes six representative equations [1]- [6] . In all equations we include the (…rst) lag of the endogenous variable which is signi…cant at the 1%-level in all speci…cations; this con…rms that the estimation method is appropriate. In [1] we start by testing the impact of the investment shares in both types of countries. As can be seen from the results, the theoretical model is con…rmed by the estimations as domestic investment a¤ects the oil-importers'income share positively while the opposite holds true for the impact of foreign investment rates. The next equation [2] exhibits that also the domestic investment rate in human capital eduexp is positive for the income share, which also holds for all the other speci…cations.
In [3] , oil taxes are included. It appears as very favorable for the theoretical model that taxation has the predicted positive sign; the signi…cance is 5% or 10% according to the speci…cation. Thus according to the empirical results, oil-importing countries can indeed increase their share of total income by raising domestic oil taxes, which is a remarkable …nding.
Population size pop, i.e. the scale of the economy, has no signi…cant e¤ect in any speci…cation, mainly because the endgenous lagged variable already captures this e¤ect. Similarly, research expenditures rdexp as well as central government debt cgovdebt have no signi…cant impact and do not change our major …ndings. In view of these results, the model predictions regarding the determination of income shares appear to be consistent with the available empirical evidence on oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. 
E¢ ciency and Policy
Given the general characteristics of the world competitive equilibrium, the e¤ects of public policy can be studied with reference to two benchmark regimes. In this section, we brie ‡y describe the characteristics of laissez-faire equilibria -in which all taxes and subsidies are set to zero -and e¢ cient allocations -i.e., allocations in which all the domestic market failures, induced by R&D externalities and monopolistic competition, are neutralized by …scal authorities through …scal instruments. This analysis provides the basis for studying the welfare consequences of discretionary variations in national resource taxes.
Laissez-Faire Equilibria
Suppose that taxes and subsidies are set to zero in each country:
From (25) and (26), the level of relative resource use under laissez-faire equals
From (30), relative resource use is positively (negatively) related to R&D productivity in Home (Foreign) through the terms ' h and ' f . This result is peculiar to the laissez-faire equilibrium, which is however ine¢ cient by construction: in each country, monopolistic competition in the intermediate sector and knowledge spillovers in the R&D sector imply that the economy misallocates domestic …nal output between R&D investment, consumption and production of intermediates. The following subsection describes the set of taxes and subsidies through which …scal authorities can restore e¢ ciency at the country level.
Conditional E¢ ciency
Suppose that a government internalizes all the domestic market failures generated by monopoly pricing and R&D spillovers. The resulting allocation is called conditionally e¢ cient, according to the following De…nition 5 An allocation is conditionally e¢ cient for country i if domestic output is allocated so as to maximize present-value utility U i subject to the technology, income, and resource constraints faced by country i at given international prices.
At the formal level, the conditionally e¢ cient allocation (CE-allocation, hereafter) is similar to the welfare-maximizing allocation that characterizes social optimality in closed-economy models. However, in the present context, conditional e¢ ciency and optimality are di¤erent concepts. In closed economies, the welfare-maximizing allocation is chosen by a social planner endowed with full control over all the elements of the allocation. The CE-allocation in country i, instead, implies the maximization of domestic utility at given international prices. The crucial point is that international prices are in ‡uenced by the …scal policies of both countries. There is no general presumption that a government actually wishes to implement the CE-allocation: this depends on the assumed information set of the policymaker. If a government actually takes international prices as given, achieving the CE-allocation is an overriding political target. If, instead, the government could infer all the general-equilibrium e¤ects generated by domestic …scal instruments, it may be desirable to deviate from conditional e¢ ciency because non-e¢ cient policies may increase domestic welfare to the detriment of the other country's welfare. Indeed, we will later show that well-informed governments have concrete incentives to deviate from conditional e¢ ciency.
We characterize CE-allocations by denoting the relevant variables by tildas. In Home, the CE-allocation is represented by the paths of imported resource ‡ows and expenditures (in consumption, intermediates'production and R&D activity), that maximize Home's indirect utility subject to the …nal-good technology, the intermediate-good technology, the R&D technology, and Home's expenditure constraint: nR
(1); (7); (16) where U h in (13) is maximized taking prices as given and the R&D externality is fully taken into account through constraint (7). In Foreign, the CE-allocation is represented by the paths of domestic resource use, exported resources, and expenditures that maximize Foreign utility subject to the technology constraints, the aggregate expenditure constraint, and the exhaustible resource constraint: nR
(1); (7); (16) and _ Q = R h R f .
Solving these maximization problems, we obtain two results. First, if a government wishes to decentralize the CE-allocation, it must implement an e¢ cient policy that consists of the following subsidies and taxes
The role of subsidies to R&D investment is clear: research activity generates positive externalities and must therefore be encouraged by public authorities throughã i > 0. This policy must be accompanied by positive taxes on resource use and intermediates' purchases because private agents exhibit ine¢ ciently low saving rates and, hence, excessive demand for the inputs employed in …nal production. The second result is: if both economies display conditional e¢ ciency, relative resource use equals 10
Expression (34) shows that the e¢ cient level of resource use is exclusively determined by preference parameters, with no role played by technology. As a consequence, it di¤ers from (coincides with) the laissez-faire level (30) when the technological parameters governing R&D productivity, ' h and ' h , are di¤erent (equal). 11 We now exploit these and the previous results in order to address the issue of strategic taxation.
Welfare
Do the governments of Home and Foreign have particular incentives to implement ine¢ cient taxes? This section shows that if …scal authorities recognize all the generalequilibrium e¤ects of national taxes -and, hence, calculate the …nal e¤ect on domestic welfare levels -they have concrete incentives to deviate from e¢ cient allocations. Further incentives arise in laissez-faire equilibria, especially when the two countries exhibit di¤erent rates of R&D productivity.
National Welfare and Resource Taxes
The reaction of utility levels to variations in domestic resource taxes is represented by two welfare-tax relationships that can derived in explicit form. Present-value utilities in the two countries equal (see Appendix)
where { i is a constant factor independent of resource taxes,
is the initial relative price of the Home …nal good, and the constants c i E c i =(P h Y Y i ) equal the ratios between consumption expenditures and …nal output in the two countries.
The three variables appearing in the square brackets in (35)-(36) generally depend on resource taxes. Hence, the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the domestic resource tax on domestic welfare, dU i =d i , can be split in three components: (i) the terms-of-trade e¤ect, (ii) the physical output e¤ect, and (iii) the consumption-share e¤ect. The direction of the …rst two e¤ects is known from Proposition 3: an increase in the Home (Foreign) resource tax increases the relative price of the Home (Foreign) good and reduces Home (Foreign) physical output. The direction of the consumption-share e¤ect -that is, the sign of d ln c i =d i -is asymmetric instead. In Home, an increase in the domestic resource tax increases the ratio between consumption and …nal output:
In Foreign, an increase in the domestic resource tax leaves the consumption-output ratio unchanged. Given d ln c f =d f = 0, the marginal welfare e¤ect of the Foreign tax only depends on the relative strength of the variations in terms of trade and physical output,
The asymmetric e¤ects of Home and Foreign taxes on the respective consumption-output ratios are directly linked to the asymmetric e¤ects on relative incomes emphasized in Proposition 4. In Home, the rent-extraction mechanism increases relative income and allows consumers to increase the value of their consumption relative to the value of domestic …nal output, all other things being equal. In Foreign, the resource tax does not in ‡uence world income shares and thus leaves the consumption-output ratio unchanged. The contrasting e¤ects of resource taxes on terms of trade and physical output imply that, in each country, the welfare-tax relationship U i ( i ) is hump-shaped: there exists a unique level of the domestic resource tax, max i , that maximizes domestic welfare for a given state of a¤airs in the other country. In particular, for each country i, the welfaremaximizing tax rate is always associated to a speci…c level of relative resource use, which we denote by max In Home, implementing the welfare-maximizing resource tax max h always implies
Proposition 6 implies that if both national governments fully recognize all the generalequilibrium e¤ects of the respective taxes on resource use, the independent pursuit of maximal domestic welfare results into con ‡icting objectives: each government seeks a di¤erent equilibrium level of relative resource use. This is a very general conclusion since neither (40) nor (39) assume that the two economies are starting from a speci…c equilibrium. The result originates in the asymmetric e¤ects of national resource taxes on utility levels -see (37)- (38) above. If the consumption-share e¤ect in Home were zero, the welfare-maximizing resource tax in Home would be associated to = = (1 ), exactly as in the Foreign economy. Hence, the economic mechanism behind Proposition 6 is the rent-transfer e¤ect, which allows Home residents to increase the ratio between consumption expenditures and domestic …nal output.
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Deviations from E¢ ciency and Laissez-Faire
Proposition 6 can be applied to speci…c contexts in which the initial state of a¤airs is a given equilibrium. We now analyze the incentives to deviate from two benchmark regimes: symmetric CE-allocations and laissez-faire equilibria. First, suppose that both governments consider as their reference equilibrium a symmetric CE-allocation: the e¢ cient taxes (31)- (32)- (33) are implemented in both countries and relative resource use is given by (34). Under this state of a¤airs, the following result holds.
Proposition 7
In an e¢ cient world equilibrium, dU h =d h > 0 and dU f =d f = 0.
Proposition 7 establishes that, given an e¢ cient world equilibrium, Home would gain from increasing the resource tax. Foreign, instead, would not gain from deviating from the initial state of a¤airs: from (39), the welfare-maximizing Foreign tax is always associated to an equilibrium in which relative resource use coincides with the e¢ cient level. 12 The incentive to increase the tax in Home clearly hinges on the possibility of earning additional income through the rent-extracting mechanism and thereby improve domestic consumption possibilities. Now consider the laissez-faire case: the reference state of a¤airs is an ine¢ cient equilibrium where all taxes and subsidies are zero. In this scenario, productivity di¤erences matter for the incentive scheme, which falls in three possible cases:
Proposition 8 Given a laissez-faire equilibrium, higher (lower) R&D productivity in Home implies an incentive for Foreign to subsidize (tax) domestic resource use:
When R&D productivity is higher in Home, relative resource use is strictly greater than the e¢ cient level: from (30), having ' h > ' f implies > = (1 ). In this situation, both countries have incentives to deviate -in particular, Foreign would gain from subsidizing domestic resource use. With respect to this result, we emphasize two points. First, hypothesis and conclusions are empirically plausible. On the one hand, oil-poor countries exhibit on average faster productivity growth than oil-rich countries. On the other hand, there is evidence of positive taxes on imported primary resources in OIM economies as well as of direct or indirect subsidies to domestic oil consumption in OEX economies (Gupta et al. 2002; Metschies, 2005) .
The two other cases reported in Proposition 8 are easily interpreted. If R&D technologies are identical in the two countries, relative resource use coincides with the ef…cient level and this implies, similarly to Proposition 7, an incentive to raise a tax in 1 2 Note that this does not mean that max f is always associated to an e¢ cient equilibrium: relative resource use may be equal to = (1 ) also in ine¢ cient equilibria. For example, when ' h = ' f , laissez-faire conditions would imply = = (1 ) -see equation (30) above -but this equilibrium is ine¢ cient due to the market failures induced by R&D externalities and monopolistic competition in the two economies.
Home and no incentive to deviate from laissez-faire in Foreign. Finally, if R&D productivity is higher in Foreign, relative resource use falls short of the e¢ cient level: Foreign would gain from raising a resource tax whereas Home would gain by implementing either a resource tax or a subsidy, depending on the width of the productivity gap.
Remarks
Our results concerning the welfare e¤ects of taxation suggest that, if domestic welfare represents the payo¤ of each government in a political game, ine¢ cient equilibria may well be the outcome. This is an issue that we leave for further research. More generally, our interest in welfare-tax relationships stems from the fact that oil taxes are extensively used in oil-importing economies and are often interpreted as stategic policies. The theoretical literature made a …rst recognition of the topic after the oil shocks of 1970s, and Bergstrom (1982) suggested that the rent-extraction e¤ect of oil taxes is virtually unbounded. This is not the case in our model, where the welfare-maximizing tax is …nite. The reason is that Bergstrom (1982) only considered taxes on imported oil in a partial equilibrium model with no trade in …nal goods -and hence without the termsof-trade e¤ects that play a crucial role in our analysis. A related paper by Brander and Djajic (1983) shows that oil importers tend to impose strategic taxes in response to monopolistic behavior of oil producers. In this respect, our results di¤er in several respects. In particular, we have shown that oil-poor economies have an incentive to raise the domestic tax starting from both laissez-faire and e¢ cient allocations -not just in response to the monopolistic behavior of oil exporters, which we have ruled out -because the rent-extraction mechanism guarantees enhanced consumption possibilities. Another original result of our paper is that Foreign has an independent incentive to subsidize domestic oil consumption when there is a structural productivity gap in favor of Home. This result is speci…c to our model and, to our knowledge, is novel to the literature: the rationale for subsidizing domestic resource use in oil-exporting economies may be exclusively due to low productivity growth in …nal sectors relative to that observed in other countries.
Conclusion
Since 1980, the aggregate income of oil-exporting countries relative to that of oil-poor countries has been remarkably constant despite structural gaps in labor productivity growth rates. We rationalized this behavior in a two-country model of asymmetric trade where growth rates are endogenously determined by R&D activity, and productivity di¤erences between countries are compensated by terms-of-trade dynamics. The model predictions regarding the basic determinants of income shares are supported by empirical evidence: the share of each oil-poor economy is positively (negatively) related to the domestic (average foreign) investment rate and to the national tax on domestic resource use. Our results regarding the marginal e¤ects of taxation are also relevant for the current policy debate. Oil taxes are extensively used in oil-importing economies and are often interpreted as stategic policies. In this respect, the model predicts that oil-poor economies have an incentive to raise the domestic tax starting from both laissez-faire and e¢ cient allocations because the rent-extraction mechanism guarantees enhanced consumption possibilities. Another empirically plausible result of the model is that oilexporting economies have a peculiar incentive to subsidize domestic resource use when they exhibit structural gaps in productivity growth rates with respect to oil-importing economies. More generally, the asymmetric welfare e¤ects of national resource taxes suggest that ine¢ cient equilibria may be the outcome of rational strategies pursued by governments involved in political games -an interesting issue that deserves further research.
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Monopoly rents.
Plugging (A.1) in (3), we have (4). Plugging (A.1) in (1) we also have
Derivation of (9)-(10). The resource extraction problem is to maximize (8) s.t. _ Q (t) = R (t). The current-value Hamiltonian is P R (t) R (t) (t) R (t), where (t) is the multiplier, and optimality conditions read
Plugging (A.4) in (A.5), we have (9). Integrating (A.5) and substituting the resulting expression in (A.6), we have lim t!1 (0) Q (t) = 0, which implies lim t!1 Q (t) = 0. Integrating _ Q (t) = R (t) between time zero and in…nity, and imposing lim t!1 Q (t) = 0, we obtain (10).
Zero-pro…ts in the R&D sector. Denoting by V i the value of each patent, the zero-pro…t condition is 13
The value of each patent satis…es the usual no-arbitrage condition
where r i (t) is the interest rate in country i. Static consumer problem. Maximizing (11) s.t. (12) for each country i = f; h, we obtain
where (A.9) is the …rst order condition in each country, (A.10) results from plugging (A.9) in (12), and (A.11) is the indirect utility function obtained from substituting (A.10) in the utility index (11). Denoting the term in square brackets in (A.11) as
. Dynamic consumer problem: derivation of (14). Individual wealth is a fraction (1=L i ) of the value of the assets in the economy,
where r i n i + P i L is income from assets and labor in country i and P R (R=L f ) is resource income for each Foreign resident. Agents in country i maximize (13) subject to the relevant constraint ((A.12) or (A.13)), using E c i =L i as control variable. Denoting by i the current-value dynamic multiplier, the optimality conditions imply L i =E i = i and _ i = i ( r i ), from which the Keynes-Ramsey rule (14). Derivation of (18). From (A.2) and (A.7), we have
1 3 Aggregate pro…ts of the R&D sector equal Vi
Y Zi, so that condition (A.7) maximizes R&D pro…ts for a given marginal productivity i. Condition (A.7) can be equivalently obtained assuming free entry in the R&D business (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) ).
where the last term follows from substituting i by (6) and
. Equations (A.7) and (6) also imply
Substituting (A.14) and (A.15) in (A.8), we get
Time-di¤erentiating (A.3) we obtain
Plugging (A.17) in (A.16) we obtain equation (18) in the text. Proof of Proposition 1. De…ne the expenditure-to-output ratios in country i as
From (4) we have A.20) where the last term follows from (2). A standard stability analysis shows that c h and d h are constant and equal to 14 (2), and (A.26) where the term in square brackets is constant, implying that (14), this implies equal interest rates in the two countries, r h = r f . Imposing r h = r f in (19) yields (20).
Proof of Proposition 2. Combining the conditions (2) for Home and Foreign, we obtain
1 is the tax-adjusted resource elasticity in …nal production. Using the de…nition R h = R f and condition (2) for country i = f , constraint (17) implies 
Dividing both sides of (A.26) by P f Y Y f and solving for c .34) where all terms to the right hand side except are constant. Since ' f ( 1)~ f > 0, equation (A.34) is globally unstable around the unique stationary point: ruling out by standard arguments explosive dynamics -which would be associated to unbounded dynamics in the propensity to consume in Foreign -we thus have (t) = in each t 2 [0; 1), where is the steady-state level obtained by imposing^ = 0 in (A.34):
From (A.27), a constant impliesP
where we can substitute (20) and (A.24) to obtain (21). Given P R R h =~ h P h Y Y h , the Hotelling rule (9) and result (A.24) imply that P R R h grows at the rate r h , so that Derivation of (25)- (26) .20) , and (27) . The other results reported in Proposition 3 hinge on the closed-form solutions 15 .41) and
where we have de…ned 0
. The right hand sides of (A.42)-(A.43) depend on tax rates only through the term . Hence, from (A.42) and (16) and (17) and substituting (2) with i = h, we obtain (28).
Derivation of (28). Taking the ratio between
Proof of Proposition 4.
is independent of tax rates by Proposition 3, the right hand side of (28) is related to tax rates only through the term 1 ~ h 1 1+ h , which implies ds h =d h > 0 and ds h =d f = 0.
Derivation of (34). Substituting the e¢ cient tax rates (31)-(32)-(33) in (26) with I i de…ned in (25), we obtain (34). The derivation of (31)- (32)- (33) is reported in the section "Further Mathematical Details" below.
Derivation of (35) 
Plugging the respective country indices, we obtain
collecting the terms to isolate the initial values, we can de…ne the constants
and rewrite U h and U f as in (35)- (36). Derivation of results (37)- (38). Expressions (37)-(38) follow from total-di¤erentiating (35)-(36) with respect to h and f , respectively. The signs of the various terms are obtained as follows. Setting t = 0 in (A.40), (A.41) and (A.43), we obtain 
where the last term comes from substituting
where d ln =d f = 0 is implied by (A.32) and d ln (~ f ) =d f = 0 follows from expression (26). 16 Proof of Proposition 6 (Foreign). Substituting (A.46) and (A.48) in (38), and using d ln =d f = (1 + f ) from (26), we have
the sign of which is determined by the term in square brackets. As is monotonously increasing in f by (26), the condition dU f =d f = 0 is univoquely associated to a Foreign tax max f associated to a relative resource use max f = = (1 ). Condition dU f =d f = 0 is a maximum because (A.51) implies dU f =d f > 0 when < = (1 ) and dU f =d f < 0 when > = (1 ). Proof of Proposition 6 (Home). Substituting (A.45), (A.47) and (A.50) in (37), we have
From (26), we have d ln =d h = (1 + h ) 1 and the above expression reduces to
the sign of which is determined by the term in curly brackets:
(1 )
where a ( h ) is strictly decreasing in h and satis…es lim h !1 a ( h ) = 0, while b ( h ) is strictly increasing in h and satis…es lim h !1 b ( h ) = 1 > 0. These results imply that U h is a hump-shaped function of h achieving a maximum for a unique …nite level
) ! dU h =d h = 0. In particular, consider any level of the Home tax, h R , such that the level of resource use is = = (1 ). Then, (A.52) and (A.53) imply a ( h ) > b ( h ) = 0, and therefore dU h =d h > 0. Consequently, the maximum condition dU h =d h = 0 is necessarily associated to a higher Home resource tax, max h > h R , that is, to a lower level of relative resource use, max h < = (1 ). Proof of Proposition 7. By (34), in a symmetric CE-allocation we have = = (1 ), in which case result (A.51) implies dU f =d f = 0 whereas (A.53) implies dU h =d h > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, is given by (30). If ' h = ' f we have = = (1 ), in which case dU f =d f = 0 and dU h =d h > 0 are proved exactly as in Proposition 7. If ' h > ' f , we have > = (1 ), which implies dU f =d f < 0 from (A.51) and dU h =d h > 0 from (A.52). If ' h < ' f , we have < = (1 ), which implies dU f =d f > 0 from (A.51) whereas, from (A.53), the sign of dU h =d h is generally ambiguous.
B Further Mathematical Details
Aggregate constraints: derivation of (16)-(17). The government budget constraint in country i is
From the …nal sectors'pro…t-maximizing conditions, we can substitute P i
where we can plug + = 1 together with condition (2) to obtain
Repeating the above steps for the Foreign economy starting from constraint (A.13), and recalling that R R f = R h , we obtain (17). 
where ! = !(P h Y ; P f Y ) is taken as given and symmetry across varieties is already imposed without any loss of generality. The …rst constraint is the …nal-good technology (1), the second is the intermediate-good technology with linear cost, the third is (16), the fourth is the R&D technology (7) with knowledge spillovers taken into account. Recalling 1 7 Since R = R h + R f and = , the intertemporal resource constraint (10) can be written as Q0 = R 1 0 R f (t) 1 + dt and directly integrated to obtain R f (0) in (B.8), from which R h (0) can be obtained as R f (0). 
where 0 h is the dynamic multiplier associated to (B.10) and 00 h is the static multiplier attached to (B.9). The optimality conditions read
h ; (B.11)
(B.13) Derivation of (34). Equation (34) is proved in (B.43).
Derivation of (31) 
